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Active Investing in Strategic Acquirers
Using an EVA Style Analysis

Abstract
Employing an EVA style classification, we examine whether active investors (such as
hedge funds and other long-short investors) can develop an alpha-generating strategy by
classifying acquisitions based on the pre-acquisition EVA style quadrant of the acquirers.
Over a recent ten-year period, the announcement evidence suggests that acquisitions
across all style quadrants generate negative risk-adjusted returns: wherein the magnitude
of economic gains from shorting acquirers is determined by EVA style characteristics;
namely wealth creators or wealth destroyers. Moreover, we find that the potential for
longing gains on targets of acquiring firms is also captured by EVA style.

JEL classifications: G11; G14; G34
Keywords: EVA; Acquisitions; EVA style of investing; Active investing; Alpha; Shorting (longing)
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Active Investing in Strategic Acquirers
Using an EVA Style Analysis

During the 1990s and beyond, large U.S. industrial firms have deployed substantial
capital resources in pursuit of strategic acquisitions. The aggregate average result of these
acquisitions is that they destroy shareholder value for the owners of the acquiring firms. There is
however, substantial cross-sectional variation in the announcement period returns of these
acquiring firms. That being said, active investors (such as hedge funds1 and other long-short
investors) may be able to develop or fine tune alpha-generating investment strategies if they can
distinguish “good” bidders (perhaps more aptly, less bad bidders) from “bad” bidders in strategic
acquisitions.
In this paper we present a framework for classifying acquiring firms into wealth creators
and wealth destroyers. We employ the EVA style analysis developed by Abate, Grant, and
Stewart [2004] to classify all large acquirers completing acquisitions over the 1990-1999 period
into one of four style quadrants based on their pre-acquisition style. We then examine the wealth
effects that these firms experience upon acquisition announcement and analyze these wealth
effects by style category. We find that the wealth effects vary by EVA style and event window,
suggesting that investors will benefit to varying degrees from a policy of shorting all style
categories of acquiring firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the literature
on acquisition wealth effects and EVA style analysis. Section 3 describes the data and method
employed. Section 4 presents the empirical results for strategic acquirers (and their targets).
1

Section 5 examines the potential shorting (and longing) implications for active-minded investors
around acquisition announcements. Section 6 discusses related EVA findings, while Section 7
summarizes and concludes the paper.

Returns Around Acquisitions and the EVA Style of Investing
Literature Review
It is well-established in the finance literature that acquiring firm shareholders, on average,
gain little if any benefit from acquisitions, and often loose value. Target firm shareholders
consistently gain value around acquisitions. These results are fairly consistent over time even
though the motives for past waves of acquisition activity have varied. For example, acquisitions
in the 1960s and 1970s were often motivated by the desire to diversify risk. In the 1980s, a large
wave of acquisition activity was driven by the desire to eliminate inefficient diversification and
create more focused companies. In the 1990s, a large wave of acquisitions was driven by more
strategic considerations. These acquisitions were motivated by a search for strategic business
combinations that would potentially produce scale and scope economies, international expansion,
and operating efficiencies. Brunner [2002] provides a comprehensive review of the acquisition
literature, supporting low and negative returns to acquiring firms across these waves of
acquisitions.
A study of large strategic acquirers making acquisitions in the late 1990s by KPMG,
finds that 53 percent of these firms complete failed acquisitions when looking at performance
one year after the acquisitions. Moller, Schlingemann, and Stulz [2004, 2005] find that large
acquirers tend to make value reducing acquisitions and that these firms in aggregate have
destroyed value. They report that acquiring-firm shareholders lost 12 cents around acquisition
2

announcements per dollar spent, for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 to 2001, compared to a
$7 billion total loss for the 1980s. Large acquisitions were generally responsible for these losses.
While a number of possible explanations have been offered for why large acquirers
continue to make value reducing acquisitions, the puzzle remains. Jensen [1986], in his freecash flow hypothesis, argues that managers with free cash flow prefer to increase firm size
through acquisitions rather than pay cash flow to shareholders. Roll [1986] argues that hubris
may account for the value destruction, as overconfident bidders overpay for acquisitions in
anticipation of overly optimistic synergistic benefits. Travlos [1987] finds that acquirers paying
with equity lose more value than those financing acquisitions with cash. Lang, Stulz, and
Walking [1989] and Servaes [1991] find higher target, bidder, and total returns around
acquisitions when bidders have high-q ratios and targets have low-q ratios. Lang, Stulz, and
Walkling [1991] find that bidder returns are negatively related to cash flow for low-q bidders but
not for high-q bidders. McCardle and Visswanathan [1994] and Jovanovic and Braguinsky
[2002] argue that firms make acquisitions when they have run out of internal growth
opportunities. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh [2002] find that acquirers with higher
valuations have lower announcement period returns. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz [2004]
provide a more detailed review of this literature.
Overall, the literature studying the wealth effects of acquisitions reports that acquiring
firm shareholders do not earn positive returns. These results are robust over merger waves
motivated by different factors, including the most recent wave of acquisitions that was largely
motivated by strategic buyers. There is however substantial cross-sectional variation in the
returns to acquiring firms and it is possible that these firms are comprised of good bidders and
bad bidders, yielding different wealth effects. Investors (such as hedge funds) interested in
3

discerning the value created by good bidders and avoiding, or raising funds by shorting, bad
bidders will be interested in analysis to distinguish good (or as we quipped, less bad bidders)
from bad bidders.
EVA Style of Investing
Economic value added (EVA) is a metric that measures the fundamental ability (or lack
thereof) of a firm to create shareholder value. EVA is a residual income measure that is positive
if a company earns more than the cost of capital on its invested capital. Stewart [1991] and
Grant [2003] provide a thorough description of EVA. A positive change in EVA results when
the return on invested capital exceeds (is less than) the cost of capital and investment is positive
(negative). Also, a negative change in EVA results when the return on invested capital is less
than (greater than) the cost of capital and investment is positive (negative). Along these lines,
firms may be classified into one of four EVA style quadrants. Wealth creators, firms with
positive changes in EVA, will exhibit either a return on capital exceeding the cost of capital and
positive investment, or a return on capital below the cost of capital and negative investment.
Wealth destroyers, firms with negative changes in EVA, will exhibit either a return on capital
less than the cost of capital and positive investment, or a return on capital exceeding the cost of
capital and negative investment. Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004], refer to this framework as an
EVA style of investing. It is also described more fully in the Method section below.
We apply the EVA style analysis to examine three questions (shown below) related to
strategic acquisitions by large acquirers. The first two questions pertain to whether acquisition
returns are positive or negative when firms are pre-classified as value creators or value
destroyers, while the third question addresses the more pertinent issue of whether active
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investors can use EVA style analysis to discern abnormal return (alpha) opportunities on
strategic acquirers (and their targets).
1) Do firms classified as wealth creators engage in value-creating acquisitions?
2) Do firms classified as wealth destroyers engage in value-destroying acquisitions?
3) Can EVA style classifications of acquirers (and targets) be used to discern varying
degrees of investment reward (alpha)?

With these questions, we examine whether the type of value creation or destruction, i.e.,
return on capital relative to cost of capital and investment being positive or negative, are related
to acquisition wealth effects, and whether or not the return differences have implications for
active-minded investors.

Data and Methods
Data
We obtain data from the 2001 Stern Stewart Performance 1000 ranking of the 1,000
largest U.S. industrial firms by market value added (MVA) for the year ended 2000. We then
match this list to a sample of acquisitions made by U.S. industrial firms over the period 19901999, obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The merged list yields a
sample of 484 U.S. industrial firms that acquired other firms over the period 1990-1999, and that
have data available in the Stern Stewart database. We obtain stock return data from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Each firm must have sufficient returns to
estimate the market model.

5

Methods
As noted before, it is well established in the finance literature that acquiring firms earn
low returns upon acquisition announcement and that these returns are often negative. Brunner
[2002] provides a comprehensive review of this literature, while Moeller, Schlingemann, and
Stulz [2004, 2005] provide recent evidence. While value creation by acquirers is questionable,
there is significant cross-sectional variation in announcement period returns to acquiring firm
shareholders. We examine whether the fundamentals of wealth creation of acquiring firms
impact their acquisition wealth effects.
Economic value added (EVA)2 is a well-known measure of economic profit or residual
income. Positive EVA suggests that a firm is fundamentally creating value by earning more than
its cost of capital. A firm’s market value added (MVA) represents the difference between its
market value of capital and its book value of capital. In principle, MVA is the present value of
future EVA discounted at the WACC. Building on earlier research by Grant [1996], Abate,
Grant, and Stewart [2004] find that 80% of wealth creating firms have jointly positive MVA- and
EVA-to-capital ratios, suggesting that a firm’s current EVA makes a contribution to its market
value. They also find that 92% of wealth destroying firms have jointly negative MVA- and
EVA-to-capital ratios, again suggesting a relation between current EVA and market value. Thus,
EVA can be taken as reasonable proxy for wealth creation.
EVA can be calculated as a firm’s net operating profit after-tax (NOPAT) minus its
invested capital (IC) times its weighted average cost of capital (WACC), or:

EVA = NOPAT − (ICxWACC )

(1)

Rearranging, Equation 1 can be expressed as:
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 NOPAT

EVA = 
− WACC  xIC
 IC


(2)

and denoting NOPAT/IC as the return on invested capital (ROIC) as:

EVA = (ROIC − WACC )xIC

(2a)

Note that ROIC – WACC shows the relation between return on capital and the cost of
capital, or the EVA spread. Recognizing that the change in invested capital over a time period is
a firm’s investment for that period, the change in EVA due to investment (assuming spread
constancy) may be expressed as:

∆EVA = (ROIC − WACC )x∆IC

(3)

EVA is positive (negative) when a firm’s return on invested capital exceeds (is less than)
its cost of capital, i.e., when the EVA spread is positive (negative). Firms with positive EVA
spreads create (destroy) value when they have positive (negative) investment. In turn, firms with
negative EVA spreads create (destroy) value when they have negative (positive) investment
characteristics.
Using this framework, we classify acquiring firms into four quadrants based on their
EVA style characteristics; following the methodology in Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004].
Firms are characterized as exhibiting either 1) Under Investment (positive EVA spread and
negative change in invested capital), 2) Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and
positive change in invested capital), 3) Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and
positive change in invested capital), or 4) Positive Restructuring (negative EVA spread and
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negative change in invested capital). Classifications are based on values for the year prior to
acquisition. Exhibit 1 shows a summary of the EVA style classifications.
Exhibit 2 reports the distribution of the 484 acquisitions by calendar year and by EVA
style quadrant for the ten years, 1990-1999. The exhibit reports a substantial increase in the
number of acquisitions over this decade. Not surprisingly, most of the acquisition activity in our
sample occurs between 1995 and 1999. The highest number of large strategic acquisitions, 117,
occurs in 1999.
We examine stock price reaction to the announcement of acquisitions using the Brown
and Warner [1985] standard event-study method to compute the daily excess returns. We use a
two-step procedure to compute the average daily abnormal returns with stock price data from
CRSP. We report our results from using both the CRSP equal-weighted and value-weighted
indexes as market proxies.
First, we estimate the parameters of a single-factor market model for each firm. We use
the returns from day –255 to day –46 to estimate each firm’s alpha and beta coefficients.
Second, we compute the excess return by subtracting a firm’s expected daily return from its
actual return. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns by summing the abnormal returns
over the periods from day –1 to day 1, day -1 to 30, and day 1 to 30, where day 0 represents
announcement of the acquisition. These abnormal returns are estimated for both the acquiring
firms and for the corresponding target firms. They are estimated in total, and for each of the four
EVA style quadrants of the acquiring firms.
Results
Overall Event Study Results

8

Exhibit 3 reports the overall event study results. The abnormal returns for the acquiring
firms are negative and statistically significant for all three event windows. The returns are 1.14%, -2.57%, and -1.80% respectively for event periods -1,1, -1,30 and 1,30 respectively. The
abnormal returns for the target firms are positive and statistically significant for all three event
windows. The returns are 24.10%, 24.16%, and 5.11% respectively for event periods -1,1, -1,30
and 1,30 respectively. All results are significant at the 1% level. Overall, these results are
consistent with prior results reported by Bruner [2002]. Notable for our study is that the
cumulative returns are not only negative (positive) for acquiring firms (targets) around the
immediate announcement date, but they are also negative (positive) for acquirers (targets) in the
30 trading day period thereafter. These results suggest overall shorting (and longing) gains by
taking active positions in acquirers (targets) following the actual announcement date. In the next
section, we take a closer look at the shorting gains on acquirers (and longing gains on targets)
according to the EVA style of investing.
Event Study Results by EVA Style

Exhibit 4 reports the event study results by the acquiring firms’ EVA style quadrants for
both the acquiring and corresponding target firms.

The announcement-period CARs for

acquirers are negative for all event windows and all four quadrants. The CARs for days -1,1
range from -0.19% for the Under Investment firms to -1.26% for the Positive Restructuring
firms, with Value-Creating Growth firms and Value-Destroying Growth firms having CARs of 1.19% and -1.18% respectively. All are statistically significant, except for the Under Investment
CARs. Exhibit 5 presents these results in a graph. Interestingly, the CARs for days -1,30 are
more negative and vary by style from the -1,1 CARs. Under Investing firms are the most
9

negative (-5.62%), followed by Positive Restructuring (-4.41%), Value-Destroying Growth (3.33%), and Value-Creating Growth (-1.77%). All of these results are statistically significant.
Exhibit 6 presents the -1,30 results. The CARs for days 1,30 are also notable with Under
Investing firms at -5.34%, followed by Positive Restructuring (-4.14%), Value-Destroying
Growth (-2.93%), and Value-Creating Growth (-0.73%). Exhibit 7 presents the 1, 30 results. All
but Value-Creating Growth are statistically significant. While they are economically different,
none of the style-quadrant CARs are statistically different from the other quadrants. Comparing
the -1,1 and -1,30 returns by quadrant, the differences for Under Investment and Positive
Restructuring are statistically significant.
These results show that acquisitions by strategic acquirers are seen as value destroying,
regardless of whether the acquiring firms are value creators or value destroyers prior to the
acquisition. Under Investing firms destroy the least amount of value in the initial days around
the acquisition announcement, while Positive Restructuring firms destroy the most value. ValueCreating Growth and Value-Destroying Growth firms are in between, with very similar measures
of value destruction. However, during the near term (days -1,30) the effects intensify and the
relative wealth effects across style categories shift. Under Investing firms destroy the most
value, followed by Positive Restructuring and Value-Destroying Growth firms, and finally
Value-Creating Growth firms at a lower level of value destruction. These results seem driven by
a continuing and intensifying value destruction effect in the 30 days after the acquisition
announcements.
It is instructive to also look at the CARs for the corresponding target firms. These can be
influenced by the premiums paid by the acquirers and the market’s assessment of the value
creation potential to the target firms. As shown in Exhibit 4, the announcement-period CARs for
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the targets are positive for all event windows and all four quadrants. The CARs for days -1,1
range from 26.59% for the targets of Value-Creating Growth acquirers to 19.61% for the ValueDestroying Growth firms. Under Investing firms closely follow Value-Creating Growth, with
CARs of 25.98%, while Positive Restructuring firms are close to Value-Destroying Growth at
20.46%. All are statistically significant. Exhibit 8 graphs the -1,1 target CARs. The CARs for
days -1,30 are very similar. Under Investing firms are the most positive (27.64%), followed by
Value-Creating Growth (26.94%), Positive Restructuring (21.80%), and Value-Destroying
Growth (18.59%). All are statistically significant. Exhibit 9 shows the -1,30 CARs. The CARs
for days 1,30, while statistically significant for all but Under Investing firms, are much lower,
with Value-Creating Growth firms at 6.32% and Under Investing, Value-Destroying Growth, and
Positive Restructuring firms at similar levels of 3.22%, 3.27%, and 3.82% respectively. Exhibit
10 shows the 1,30 target CARs. While the style-quadrant CARs are economically different, only
the Value-Creating Growth and Value-Destroying Growth CARs are statistically different.
Comparing the -1,1 and -1,30 returns by quadrant, none of the differences are statistically
significant.
These results show that acquisitions by strategic acquirers are seen as value creating for
the corresponding target firms, regardless of whether the acquiring firms are value creators or
value destroyers. Under-Investing firms and Value-Creating Growth firms add the most value to
targets in the days around the acquisition announcement, while Value-Destroying Growth and
Positive Restructuring firms add similar amounts, but somewhat less than the other two styles.
In the near term, (days -1,30) the effects, both absolute and relative, are very similar. The results
are much weaker for the 30 days subsequent to the announcement, suggesting less value creation
for targets after the announcement.
11

Overall, these results show that strategic acquisitions by large acquirers in the 1990s
produce, on average, negative abnormal returns to acquiring firm shareholders of -1.14% and 2.57% for days -1,1 and -1,30 respectively, while target firm shareholders earn positive abnormal
returns of 24.10% and 24.16% for these periods. When the acquirer returns are segmented into
four EVA style categories, Under Investing firms experience the lowest level of short-term value
reduction (-0.19%), while Positive Restructuring firms lose the most value (-1.93%). However,
the value reduction continues in the 30 days subsequent to the acquisitions, with Under Investing
firms losing the most value (-5.62%) and Growth-Creating Value firms losing the least (-1.77%)
and Positive Restructuring and Growth-Destroying-Value firms in between, losing -4.41% and 3.33% respectively.3 Under Investing and Growth-Creating Value firms make acquisitions with
higher target abnormal returns, suggesting that they pay higher premiums and/or engage in
acquisitions that create more target value. Growth-Destroying Value and Positive Restructuring
firms make acquisitions with lower target returns. These results are consistent with Lang, Stulz,
and Walking [1989, 2001] and Servaes [1991] in that the Value-Creating-Growth firms, likely to
be high MVA and high q, create the most value.

Implications for Active Investors
Shorting (and longing) Opportunities

We now turn to the active investing implications of our stock market findings on large
strategic acquirers and their targets. We begin with the acquirers. Since the cumulative abnormal
returns in Exhibit 5 across all event windows and EVA styles are negative, this pervasive value
destruction finding suggests that it is best for active investors to short them all. In economic
terms, the shorting opportunity across strategic acquirers varies in magnitude by EVA style;
12

reinforcing our contention that style classifications matter not only for shareholders when
assessing the magnitude of value destruction in acquiring firms, but also for active investors
(notably, event-driven hedge funds) seeking profitable trading opportunities around the
announcement of corporate acquisitions.
As shown in Exhibit 7, the EVA style analysis reveals that shorting opportunities are the
highest among Under Investing firms, as the cumulative residuals are negative at the time of the
acquisition announcement and then fall precipitously during the 30 trading days following the
announcement. This suggests that investors underestimate the extent of value destruction by
Under Investing firms in their assessment at the announcement date. Moreover, shorting
opportunities are clearly evident in the Value-Destroying Growth firms as well as in the Positive
Restructuring firms, as the cumulative abnormal returns are negative at the time of acquisition
announcement and in the 30 trading days thereafter. On the other hand, shorting opportunities
are least available among Value-Creating Growth firms as their cumulative residuals are negative
at the acquisition announcement date, but they change only slightly in the post announcement
period. This suggests limited shorting opportunities for investors around acquisition
announcements by wealth creating firms.
The fact that the cumulative abnormal returns are generally negative in the EVA styles
following the acquisition announcement suggests that either the market is inefficient in pricing
corporate acquisitions, or there is other unforeseen negative information or common risk factors
that impact post-announcement returns. These factors can lead to varying degrees of shorting
opportunities, particularly for hedge fund investors who are likely to use leverage to magnify the
expected gains from shorting acquirers, both at the time of the acquisition announcement and in
the 30 trading days thereafter. With respect to targets, Exhibit 10 shows that a continuing post13

announcement effect is evident in the post-announcement returns; varying in magnitude of
positive residuals by EVA style classifications for wealth creator and wealth destroyer acquirers.
Specifically, longing opportunities on target firms are available across the four EVA style
categories. This is particularly the case for the targets of (1) Value-Creating Growth acquirers;
where the potential for significant value creation goes directly to target firm shareholders, and
(2) the targets of Under-Investing acquirers; where, due to limited-to-declining organic growth
opportunities these firms are forced to diversify or “pay up” in a misguided attempt to recapture
the growth glory days.4 Although the reasons may differ as to why firms become acquirers, the
CAR results show economic gains to target firm shareholders and active-minded investors who
distinguish targets by EVA style.

Related EVA Results
We have also investigated post-announcement EVA happenings to explain the negative
returns to large strategic acquirers. Our regressions (not shown) indicate that returns on invested
capital and EVA spreads decline subsequent to acquisitions for most EVA styles. Exhibit 11
captures the negative EVA spread changes for Under-Investing, Value-Creating Growth, and
Value-Destroying Growth acquirers; whereby EVA spreads for these acquirers decline by 1.09%, -4.31%, and -1.49% respectively in the year following an acquisition. At -4.31%, the
post-announcement decline in EVA spread is especially poignant for the Value-Creating Growth
acquirers. If correct, this suggests that firms with higher levels of pre-acquisition EVA lose more
economic profit than low-EVA firms when they engage in acquisitions; perhaps, in a perverse
view, because they can better “afford” to.
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In contrast, the EVA spread changes for Positive Restructuring acquirers are reflective of
an interesting empirical anomaly. As shown in Exhibit 11, we find that the EVA spread of
Positive Restructuring firms actually increases (by 85 basis points on average) in the year
following an acquisition. Moreover, Exhibit 12 shows that some 60% of Positive Restructuring
firms increased their EVA spread in the year following an acquisition, while the spread
improvement is only about 25% for Under-Investing and Value-Creating Growth acquirers.
Although the Positive Restructuring firms are apparently moving in the right direction–with
positive economic profit momentum–the large negative abnormal returns observed in our study
for this EVA style reinforce an earlier contention by Grant [1996, 2003]. He argues that risky
troubled companies face an “abundance” of adverse managerial noise such that their positive
restructuring efforts falls on investors deaf ears.5

Summary and Conclusion
While numerous prior studies have examined returns to acquiring firm shareholders upon
the announcement of acquisitions, including the recent wave of strategic acquisitions, the
negative wealth effects to these firms remains a puzzle. As with others, we are left with the more
fundamental question of why do corporate bidders (strategic or otherwise) become “bidders” in
the first place? That being asked, our study suggests that active investors (hedge funds and other
long-short investors) seeking to develop alpha-generating investing strategies from shorting
acquiring firms (and longing target firms) can benefit from methods that distinguish wealthcreating from wealth-destroying firms. We employ the EVA style analysis developed by Abate,
Grant, and Stewart [2004] to classify acquirers into one of four style categories based on the
sources of pre-acquisition wealth creation or destruction. We then examine the wealth effects to
15

large strategic acquirers, seeking to distinguish “good” (now aptly less bad acquirers) from “bad”
acquirers based on these pre-acquisition style classifications.
Our event study and EVA style results are consistent with the literature in that while
pursuing returns from strategic acquisitions, active-minded investors should consider shorting
them all. Our contribution shows that shorting opportunities for investors vary in magnitude by
EVA style; reinforcing our contention that style classifications matter not only for shareholders
when assessing the magnitude of value destruction in acquiring firms but also for active investors
seeking profitable trading opportunities around the announcement of corporate acquisitions.
Moreover, we find that the economic potential for longing opportunities in targets of strategic
acquirers is also captured by EVA style characteristics of wealth creator and wealth destroyer
acquirers.
Regarding the three questions that we raised at the outset, the joining of EVA style
analysis with the more traditional event study analysis leads us to say “no” to the first question,
while answering the second and third questions in the affirmative. We find that 1) wealth
creating firms (prior positive EVA) do not create value through strategic acquisitions; although
they appear to destroy the least amount of shareholder value, 2) wealth destroying firms (prior
negative EVA) destroy value via corporate acquisitions; although a stock market anomaly seems
present in the pricing of restructuring acquirers that are trying to turn a negative EVA situation
around, and 3) varying degrees of shorting (and longing) opportunities on large strategic
acquirers (and targets) are potentially economically available to active investors using the EVA
style of analysis.

16
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Exhibit 1–EVA Style Quadrants
Description of EVA investment styles following the method of Abate, Grant, and Stewart [2004]. Firms are
classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating
Growth (positive EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA
spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA spread and negative change
in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital (net operating profit after tax divided by
invested capital) minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications are based on values for the year prior to
acquisition.

Quadrant I:

Quadrant II:

Under
Investment

WealthCreating
Growth

>0

<0

Quadrant
III:

Quadrant IV:

WealthDestroying
Growth

Positive
Restructuring

>0

<0

<0

>0

>0

<0

EVA Spread
(Return on Invested Capital minus
Weighted Average Cost of Capital)

Investment
(Change in Invested Capital)
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EVA Spread %
Quadrant I:
Underinvestment

Quadrant II:
Growth-Creating Value

Growth in Net
Invested Capital

Quadrant IV:
Positive Restructuring

Quadrant III:
Growth-Destroying Value
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Exhibit 2–Yearly Distribution of Acquisitions by EVA Style
Distribution by year of 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern
Stewart Performance 1000. Firms are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in
invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), WealthDestroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring
(negative EVA spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested
capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications are based on values for the year prior to acquisition.

Year of
adoption

Under
Investment

WealthCreating
Growth

WealthDestroying
Growth

Positive
Restructuring

Total

1990

1

9

0

0

10 (2.07%)

1991

0

8

8

1

17 (3.51%)

1992

0

2

4

1

7 (1.45%)

1993

1

7

5

4

17 (3.51%)

1994

0

17

9

3

29 (5.99%)

1995

3

21

16

3

43 (8.88%)

1996

1

43

13

4

61 (12.60%)

1997

2

49

27

3

81 (16.74%)

1998

8

64

28

2

102 (21.07%)

1999

6

68

34

9

117 (24.17%)

22

288

144

30

(4.55%)

(59.50%)

(29.75%)

(6.20%)

Total

484 (100%)
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Exhibit 3–Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Acquiring and Target Firms
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in
the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Results are shown for acquiring firms and the corresponding target firms.
Note that returns were not available on the CRSP tapes for one target firm. Z-statistics are shown in parentheses.

Acquiring

Target

Firms

Firms

484

483

CAR -1,1

-1.14%
(-5.338)***

24.10%
(95.787)***

CAR -1,30

-2.57%
(-3.852)***

24.16%
(30.448)***

CAR 1,30

-1.80%
(-2.827)***

5.11%
(6.883)***

Number of Observations
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Exhibit 4–CAR for Acquiring and Target Firms by EVA Style
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in
the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative
change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive change in invested capital),
Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring
(negative EVA spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested
capital (net operating profit after tax divided by invested capital) minus weighted average cost of capital.
Classifications are based on values for the year prior to acquisition. Results are shown for acquiring firms and the
corresponding target firms. Note that returns were not available on the CRSP tapes for one target firm. Z-statistics
are shown in parentheses.

Under
Investment

WealthCreating
Growth

WealthDestroying
Growth

Positive
Restructuring

Total

N=22
-0.19%
(-0.110)

N=288
-1.19%
(-3.796)***

N=144
-1.18%
(-3.279)***

N=30
-1.26%
(-2.418)**

N=484
-1.14%
(-5.338)***

CAR -1,30

-5.62%
(-1.783)*

-1.77%
(-2.163)**

-3.33%
(-2.143)**

-4.41%
(-2.548)**

-2.57%
(-3.852)***

CAR 1,30

-5.34%
(-1.805)*

-0.73%
(-0.970)

-2.93%
(-1.980)**

-4.14%
(-2.464)**

-1.80%
(-2.827)***

N=22
25.98%
(25.727)***

N=287
26.59%
(82.836)***

N=144
19.61%
(38.716)***

N=30
20.46%
(21.281)***

N=483
24.10%
(95.787)***

CAR -1,30

27.64%
(9.350)***

26.94%
(26.020)***

18.59%
(12.158)***

21.80%
(7.225)***

24.16%
(30.448)***

CAR 1,30

3.22%
(1.491)

6.32%
(5.944)***

3.27%
(2.878)***

3.82%
(1.676)*

5.11%
(6.883)***

Acquiring Firms

CAR -1,1

Target Firms

CAR -1,1
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Exhibit 5—Acquirer’s CARs, Days -1, 1
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition.
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EVA Style of Investing Acquisition Analysis

0.00%
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-0.20%

-0.40%
Average market return for
acquirer: market close on
day preceeding to market
close on day following
acquisition

-0.60%

-0.80%

-1.00%
-1.19%
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Quadrant 1:
Underinvestment

Quadrant II: Growth
Quadrant III: Growth
creates Shareholder
destroys Shareholder
Value
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Acquirer's Investment Quadrant in year preceeding acquisition

Quadrant IV: Positive
Restructuring

Exhibit 6—Acquirer’s CARs, Days -1, 30
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition.
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EVA Style of Investing Acquisition Analysis

0.00%
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Exhibit 7—Acquirer’s CARs, Days 1, 30
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition.
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EVA Style of Investing Acquisition Analysis

0.00%
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Exhibit 8—Target’s CARs, Days -1, 1
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition. Note that returns were not available on the CRSP tapes for one target firm.
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EVA Style of Investing Acquisition Analysis
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Exhibit 9—Target’s CARs, Days -1, 30
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition. Note that returns were not available on the CRSP tapes for one target firm.
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EVA Style of Investing Acquisition Analysis
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Exhibit 10—Target’s CARs, Days 1, 30
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition. Note that returns were not available on the CRSP tapes for one target firm.
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EVA Style of Investing Acquisition Analysis

6.32%
7.00%

6.00%

5.00%
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Exhibit 11—Acquirer’s Change in EVA Spread: Year Preceding-to-Year Following Acquisition
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
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spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition.
EVA Style of Investing Acquisition Analysis
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Exhibit 12—Percentage Change in Acquirer’s EVA Spread: Year Preceding-to-Year Following Acquisition
Announcement-period returns for 484 acquisitions completed 1990-1999 by acquiring firms with data included in the Stern Stewart Performance 1000. Firms
are classified as Under Investment (positive EVA spread and negative change in invested capital), Wealth-Creating Growth (positive EVA spread and positive
change in invested capital), Wealth-Destroying Growth (negative EVA spread and positive change in invested capital), or Positive Restructuring (negative EVA
spread and negative change in invested capital). EVA spread is calculated as return on invested capital minus weighted average cost of capital. Classifications
are based on values for the year prior to acquisition.
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1

Among hedge funds, our EVA-based, acquisition-return findings are most relevant to the event-driven (E.D.) style of hedge fund investing.
EVA® is a registered trademark of Stern Stewart & Co.
3
We qualify this negative commentary about “Positive Restructuring” firms in a later section; whereby, we find that the risk-adjusted stock prices of Positive
Restructuring firms decline around the acquisition announcement date even though these firms demonstrate an improvement in their economic profit (EVA)
outlook.
4
We thank James Abate for pointed commentary on problematic acquirers in the Under-Investing quadrant.
5
Such an EVA risk effect on troubled firms is recently validated by Zaima [2008].
2
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